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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Trends and Developments 
1. Coordinated Industry Case Program/Industry Specialization Program 
a. These two initiatives focus on large cases and include an enhanced 
emphaSis on international matters. The IRS recognized the need 
for more expertise and concentrated efforts on specialized industry 
segments and industry specific issues. 
b. The IRS has instituted teams to assist Special Trial Attorneys in 
these programs that include legal, accounting, economic, and 
engineering specialists; 
c. Application of the Large Business and International Division's 
bUSiness-style exam process to IRS audits of high-net-worth 
individuals in a new "industry group" called the Global High 
Wealth Industry Group whereby the LB&I exam team uses a 
holistic approach that includes examining the full web of entities 
connected to a taxpayer, including international components. ' 
2. Tax Shelter Litigation 
a. ' Cases involving BOSS or SON of BOSS tax shelters have been 
heavily litigated in Tax Court in the last few years. The Service 
has aggressively pursued these marketed tax shelter cases. At 
times, the differentiation between 'a tax shelter and traditional tax' 
planning transaction has been blurred. Many cases for which 
practitioners consider simple tax planning have been caught up in 
the IRS enhanced litigation pursuits. 
3. Forum Selection 
a. Traditionally, the majority of major tax controversies have been 
litigated in the United States Tax Court. In 2010, the Tax Court's 
docket caseload exceeded 29,600 cases that aggregated over $26.6 
billion of disputed tax liability. Many taxpayers seek review in Tax 
Court because of the less burdensome jurisdictional requirements. 
Many taxpayers are not able to pay the entire disputed tax amount 
prior to seeking judicial review, which is required for district court 
review. ' 
b. Tax Court rules and procedures generally follow a more infonnal 
approach than other federal courts. In practice, the Tax Court 
prefers that counsel for taxpayers and the IRS engage in infonnal 
discovery and attempt to resolve factual issues without the use of 
fonnal discovery. Recently, the Tax Court changed its rules 
relating to discovery procedures. The changes have resulted in the 
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Tax Court moving toward a more traditional federal court model 
with increased use of formal discovery techniques including 
requests for admissions, interrogatories, and depositions. 
c. Recent trends have shown that more major tax cases are being 
decided by the Court of Federal Claims. As of May 2011, the 
Court of Federal Claims had approximately 300 cases pending 
before the coUrt. The average dollar amount involved in these 
cases was over $12 million. This forum has issued major opinions 
in recent years relating to economic substance and substance over 
form doctrines. (See Part VII.D for a more detailed discussion on 
the inconsistencies present in Court of Claim decisions.) Recent 
major decisions include: 
(1) Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 
(2004) (Company offset $240 million gain with contingent 
liabilities that had been transferred to a "litigation 
management activity fund." Court found that principal 
purpose of the transaction was not tax avoidance.) 
(2) 
(a) The Federal Circuit (454 F. 3d 1340 (2006)) in 
reviewing the case stated five principles of 
economic substance: 
(i) A lack of economic substance is sufficient to . 
disqualify the transaction without proof that 
the taxpayer's sole motive is tax avoidance; 
(ii) The taxpayer's bear the burden of proof; 
(iii) The transaction must be analyzed 
objectively, therefore the taxpayer's. 
subjective understanding of the deal waS 
irrelevant; 
(iv) The court should focus in on the transaction 
which actually gave rise to the deduction; 
and 
(v) Transactions which have no economic 
impact on third parties bear especially close 
scrutiny. 
(b) Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and'found 
that the transaction lacked economic substance. 
Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007) 
(involving foreign currency options. Court of Federal 
Claims applied the Coltec economic substance test and 
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( 
( 
found that transactions lacked economic substance and 
should be disregarded for tax purposes even though it met 
literal code requirements). 
(3) Stobie Creek Investments v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 
(2008) (involving Son of Boss with a twist. Court applied 
the Coltec economic substance test and found that 
transaction lacked economic substance.) 
(4) Consolidated Edison Co. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 
(2009) (involving lease in-lease riut transaction with a 
foreign utility. Court applied the Coltec economic 
substance test and found that the transaction had economic 
substance and a non-tax business purposes) 
d. The United States Distri<;t Courts saw a decrease in refund cases 
filed between March 2009 and March 2010 (1,233) from the prior 
period (1,420). Of the 1,349 cases for which the Courts terminated 
between March 2009 and March 2010 only 21 actually began trial 
proceedings. 
II. INFORMATION GATHERING 
A. Introduction 
1. During the last few years, the IRS has made a concerted attempt to obtain 
as broad a swath of client documents as possible. The environment 
surrounding tax reporting and filing has changed. As a result, and in order 
to properly defend a tax controversy, it is imperative for taxpayers to 
understand the various information production privileges available to 
them. This risk is one which cannot be ignored; increasingly, it is clear 
that what you say and the thought processes and deliberations that went 
iilto that statement can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
2. There are a number of privileges that may protect the deliberative process 
from inadvertent or involuntary disclosure to the IRS. The most 
significant privileges are the attorney-client privilege (both as to 
communications with lawyers and federally enrolled agents) and the work-
product doctrine. 
3. Recent practice has identified a number of situations where clients have 
been forced to disclose to the IRS and other tax authorities their candid, 
honest and internal discussions of tax risks relatedto business 
transactions. This forced disclosure not only provided tax auditors with a 
road map, but it also gave the government ammunition to use in 
challenging the company's tax position ... 
4. In most cases, what caused this forced disclosure of internal tax 
discussions was inadvertent - and fully avoidable. It resulted from the 
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failure of company personnel to preserve privilege and confidentiality 
during their early-stage discussions with third-parties. And, in several 
cases, it resulted in a waiver of attorney-client privilege and attorney work 
product confidentiality for the entire issue - meaning that the law 
department's files became subject to discovery'. 
. B. IRS Initiatives 
L In the past few years, the IRS has dramatically expanded its efforts.to curb 
abusive tax transactions, including corporate tax shelters. The most 
notable IRS efforts include: 
a. New, expansive definitions of "tax shelters" and "reportable 
transactions." 
b. New tax return disclosure requirements on taxpayers. 
c. New "reportable transaction" and list maintenance requirements on 
material advisors. . 
d. New nationally c09rdinated taX shelter examination teams. 
e. New penalty provisions. 
2. Other expansions of IRS review of taxpayers include increased attempts to. 
access data and corporate records which, traditionally, the IRS has not 
sought, including: 
a. E-mails and other correspondence describing the tax benefits - and 
the tax risks - of specific transactions; 
b. Internal fmancial analysis of alternative tax strategies; and· 
c. Management presentations regarding neg?tiation strategies. 
d. The IRS is also expanding efforts to access auditor workpapers, 
including the increasingly detailed F AS 5 tax accruals and 
valuation analysis. . 
C. Increased Use of Summonses (including SB/SE cases) 
1. IDRs - The IRS gathers information using multiple techniques. The IRS 
will issue Information Document Request ("IDR") to the taxpayer. Either 
the taxpayer or its representative routinely discuss any problems or issues 
relating to providing responses to these requests with the examining agent. 
If a taxpayer does not comply or cooperate with the agent, the agent has 
the power to issue summons for the information requested in the original 
IDR. See IRC §7602. 
2. Section 7602 limits the ability of the IRS to request documents and 
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records to only items that are relevant or material to their inquiry. 
However, the standard for relevance in this regard is very low. As long as 
the items requested are helpful or shed light on the correctness of the 
inquiry, the request will be allowed. 
3. . The IRS also will attempt to gather documents from third parties in the 
course of the audit. The IRS will issue summons to third-party 
recordkeepers. These third parties may include banks, brokers, attorneys, 
and accountants. In most situations, the IRS will prQvide the taxpayer 
notice of the issuance of a third party summons to give the taxpayer the 
opportunlty to challenge the summons. However, the IRS does not have 
to provide notice if it is issued in the aid of collection of an assessment or 
judgment. See IRC 7609(c)(2)(D). 
D. Attorney Client Privilege 
'1. Under the most common formulation, determining if a communication 
deserves protection under the attorney-client privilege requires an an~ysis 
of six separate elements -- all of which must be satisfied for the privilege 
to apply. The attorney-client privilege protects: 
a. Communications from a client. 
b. . To a lawyer. 
c. Related to the rendering of legal advice. 
d.' Made with the expectation of confidentiality. 
e. Not in furtherance of a future crime or fraud. 
£ As long as the privilege has not been waived . 
. E. Work Product Doctrine 
1. General Considerations 
a. Work product is NOT privilege. 
b. . Work product is based 6n notions of fairness in litigation. Courts 
consider it unfair to require a party in litigation to disclose all their 
thinking and strategy on a case to the other side .. 
c. Work product, unlike attorney-client privilege, does not require an 
attorney. 
d. In order to apply, the document or analysis at issue must be 
prepared "because of' litigation rather than in the o.rdinaiy course 
of business. 
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· ·2. Objectively reasonable expectation of litigation 
a. Burden of proof is on the party claiming protection, and should be 
documented. 
b. In Federal Tax Court, an expectation of an audit by the IRS is not 
considered an objectively reasonable basis to expect litigation, and 
therefore, work product protection will not attach in Tax Court. . 
However, in U.S. District Court (in which federal tax claims may 
·also be brought), a more liberal rule is available. See U.S. v. 
Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006). 
3. Subjective Expectation of Litigation 
a. Burden of proof is on the party claiming protection, and should be 
documented. 
F. Differences Between the Work Product Doctrine and theAttorneYMClient 
Privilege 
1. Unlike the attorneYMclient privilege, the work product doctrine: 
a. Is relatively new. 
b. Has a fairly modest purpose. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d . 
496,500 (7th Cir. 1999); Bowman v. Brush Wellman, Inc., No. 00 
C 50264, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,2001). 
c. Is a creature of statute and ·rule. 
d. Applies to nonMlawyers. 
e. Arises only at certain times. 
f. Only protects communications made "because of' litigation. 
g.. May be asserted by the client or the lawyer. 
h. May not l~t forever. 
1. May be overcome if the adversary really needs the information. 
J. Is not easily waived.2 
2 Thomas E. Spahn, Ten Differences Between the Work Product Doctrine and the AttomeYMClient 
Privilege, 46 Va. Law. 45 (Oct. 19(7). 
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2. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine: 
a. Does not rest on the intimacy of the attorney-client relationship --
a lawyer does not even have to be involved in its creation. 
b. Doe:; not rest on the confidentiality within that intimate 
relationship -- it protects such materials as pictures of accident 
scenes, measurements of skid marks, interviews with strangers, etc. 
c. Does not rest on communications within that intimate 
relationship -- the work product doctrine can protect materials that 
have never been communicated to anyone. 
d. The work product doctrine is both narrower and broader than the 
attorney-client privilege. 
e. It is narrower because: the work product doctrine only applies at 
certain times (during or in anticipation of litigation); and is not 
actually a privilege, but rather a quwified immunity that can be 
overcome under certain circumstances. 
f. It is broader because: anyone can create work product (without a 
lawyer's involvement); and work product can be shared more 
easily with third parties without causing a waiver of its protection. 
3. Lawyers and their clients considering both the attorney-client privilege 
and the work product doctrine should remember that both, either or none 
may apply in certain circumstances. 
a. For instance, communications between lawyers and their clients 
occurring when no one anticipates,litigation can never be work 
product, but may deserve priVilege protection. 
b. Materials reflecting lawyers' communications with those other than 
clients (or the lawyers' own agents) can rarely if ever be privileged, 
but may well be work product -- such as notes of a witness 
interview. . 
G. ' Waiver of Work Product 
1. Whereas the attorney-client privilege is always waived by any disclosure 
outside the attorney-client relationship, disclosing work product to third 
parties does not automatically waive that protection. Viacom, Inc. v. 
Sumitomo Corp. (In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig.), 200 F.R.D. 2l3, 221 
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
2. This difference in waiver principles between the attorney-client privilege 
and the work product doctrine sometimes means that sharing materials 
protected by both 1?e attorney-client privilege and the work product 
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doctrine might waive the fonner but not the latter. Calvin Klein 
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198'F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (sharing 
infonnation with a public relations firm). 
3. Disclosure to third party other than an adversary generally causes a waiver 
only if the disclosure makes it likely that ~e work product will "fall into 
enemy hands" -- ending up with the adversary. Bowman v. Brush 
Wellman, Inc., No. 00 C 50264, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14088, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,2001); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1081,1082 (4th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). Sharing with friend or ally 
does not waive protection. Sheets v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., No. 
4:04CV00058, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27060 (W.D .. Va. Nov. 8,2005) 
(holding that a personal injury plaintiff did not waive the work product 
protection by sharing work product with others involved in a boating 
accid~nt; noting that those to whom the plaintiff disclosed the work 
product shared the plaintiff's interest in obtaining insurance coverage for 
the boating accident). 
4. PRACTICE NOTE: Given this difference between the attorney-client 
privilege and work product doctrine, it makes sense to share work product 
only under a confidentiality agreement. A confidentiality agreement 
'would not prevent waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but might 
demonstrate that the party disclosing work.product did not increase the 
chance the adversary would obtain access to the work product. Blanchard 
v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192 F.RD. 233, 237-38 (N.D~ Ill.2000). 
5. Disclosure of Work Product to Outside Auditors 
a. Courts have held that sharing protected work product with outside 
auditors does not result in waiver of work product protection. 
Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy. Inc., 229 F.RD. 441, 
444,447,448,449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
b. In case closely watched as one of the government's first efforts to 
get tax accrual workpapers through court proceeding~ from a 
fmancial services subsidiary of conglomerate Texatron, Inc. United 
, States v Textron, Inc., No. 06-198T:(D.R.I. August 29,2007). 
(1) District Court Phase:' Textron Victory 
(a) . The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode 
Island denied the goveinment's petition to get the 
2001 tax accrual workpapers from Textron, Inc:'s 
financial services subsidiary. 
(b) Facts: Textron, Inc. (Textron), a publicly traded 
corporation with approximately 190 subsidiaries, 
had a subsidiary that provided commercial lending 
and financial services (Textron Financial Corp. 'or 
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(c) 
TFC) relied on Textron attorneys, private law firms, 
and outside accounting firms for,advice regarding 
tax matters. IRS learned that TFC had engaged in 
illne "sale-in, lease-out" (SILO) transactions 
involving telecommunications equipment and rail 
equipment. Because the transactions were 
considered to be of a type engaged in for the 
purpose of tax avoidance, IRS issued more than 500 
IDRs to Textron. In June 2005, the IRS manager 
examining Textron's return issued an administrative 
summons for all of the tax accrual work papers for 
" Textron's tax year ending Dec. 29, 2001. Textron 
refused to produce its tax accrual work papers 
asserting that they were privileged and that the 
summons was issued for an improper purpose. 
During the course of an audit conducted by 
Textron's independent auditor, Textron permitted 
the auditor to examine the final tax accrual work 
papers at issue in the case with the understanding 
that the information was to be treated as 
confidential. 
Reasoning: The District Court at trial said 
, deterinination of any tax owed must be based on 
factual information, none of which is contained in 
the work papers and all of which is readily available 
to the IRS through the issuance of information 
document requests (IDRs) and by other means. The 
District Court said that, in its view, the papers 
sought by the IRS would have little bearing on 
calculating Textron's tax liability. "The opinions of 
Textron's counsel, either favorable or unfavorable, 
would have little to do with that determination, and 
forced disclosure of those opinions would put 
Textron at an unfair disadvantage in any dispute 
that might arise with the IRS," the court found. The 
District court ruled the requested documents are 
protected by the work product privilege, supporting 
Textron's claims. "The IRS has failed to carry the 
burden of demonstratIng a 'substantial need' for 
ordinary work product, let alone the heightened 
burden applicable to Textron's tax accrual work 
papers, which constitute opinion work product," the 
court said in a 34-page opinion. 
(2) 1st Circuit Phase - Government Victory (United States v. 
Textron, 577 F. 3d 21 (1 st Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 
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(a) The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals held that Textron's 
tax accrual workpapers were not protected from 
discovery by the IRS. 
(b) Reasoning: The workpapers were independently 
required by statutory and audit requirements and; 
therefore, the work product privilege'did not apply. 
(c) The Court stated that unless·the document was 
prepared for use in potential litigation, the Court did 
not believe the work product privilege applied. Tax 
accrual workpapers are prepared in support of 
financial statement certification by independent 
auditors, not potential litigation. 
(d) The dissent in Textron argued that the test adopted 
by the majority is more narrow and restrictive than 
prior precedent. The dissenting opinion saw no 
reason to require a taxpayer to provide the IRS their 
assessment of the likely outcome of litigation 
simply because it was created for a business 
purpose. 
(3) Supreme Court - In 2010, the Supreme Court denied' 
Textron's petition for certiorari. (Textron v. United States, 
.130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010». 
c. This new debate has caused great concern to in-house lawyers, 
who find themselves pressured by outside auditors to disclose 
litigation-related analyses, litigation outcome predictions, etc. --
yet justifiably worry about waiving the work product protection 
that would otherwise entitle the companies to withhold such 
documents from the private plaintiffs against whom they are 
litigating. 
d. IRS releases internal memoranda on FIN 48. "FIN 48 Disclosures 
... should be considered by examiners and others when 
conducting risk assessments." (Deborah Nolan, LMSB 
Commissioner): The battle wages on despite. such court decisions 
like the Textron decision. 
e. Since its release on July 13; 2006, FIN 48 has generated 
considerable interest ·and concern.' Many taxpayers fear that the 
disclosures required by FIN 48 and the workpapers prepared in 
connection therewith will serve as a "roadmap" for IRS 
examinations. The IRS Office of Chief Counsel has determined 
that FIN 48 Workpapers are Tax Accrual Workpapers (TA W), and . ( 
are therefore subject to the IRS' current policy of restraint as . 
contained in IRM 4.10.20. IRS officials have stated, however, that 
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the current TAW Policy is being evaluated to ensure that it is still 
appropriate in today' s environment. 
f. The memorandum captioned "FIN 48 Implications LMSB Field 
Examiner's Guide," lists ten common questions and answers 
related to the requirements of FIN 48. The first question, and the 
one most likely on taxpayers' and IRS examiner's minds is, "Are 
FIN 48 Disclosures a Roadmap for the IRS 7" The memorandum 
does not answer this question with a simple ''yes'' or "no," but it is 
clear from the answer that, at a minimum, IRS examiners should 
use the FIN 48 disclosures to point them in the right direction. The 
answer notes that FIN 48 disclosures may lack specificity, and 
therefore, it may be difficult, for example, to know whether the 
disclosure has a U.S. tax or foreign tax implication. Nevertheless, 
the answer goes on to state, "Even with the lack of specificity, tax 
footnotes included in fmancial statements, including FIN 48 . 
Disclosures, should be carefully reviewed and analyzed as part of 
the audit planning process. . 
.g. The se·cond question and answer in the memorandum addresses the 
impact of FIN 48 on the IRS ' TAW Policy. While the answer 
states that FIN 48 Workpapers are TAWs, and therefore, subject to 
the policy of restraint, FIN 48 Disclosures are another matter. "On 
the other hand, FIN 48 Disclosures reported in quarterly and/or 
annual financial statements, and any other public documents, are 
not subject to the policy of restraint, and should be considered by 
examiners and others when conducting risk assessments." 
h. A number. of the questions and answers address taxpayers' 
concerns about obtaining certainty on tax issues more quickly 
through closing agreements, restricted consents to extend the 
statute oflimitations, and the IRS' pre-flling programs (Industry 
Issue Resolution, Pre-filing Agreements, Advance Pricing 
Agreements, and Compliance Audit Program) and post-flling 
programs (Joint Audit Plan, LIFE, Advance Issue Resolution, 
Appeals Fast Track Program, Accelerated Issue Resolution, and 
Early Referral to Appeals). In this regard, the memorandum notes, 
"We can remind taxpayers that candor, transparency and the right 
motivationS, coupled with programs and processes we have iIi 
place today.can quickly generate certainty on tax issues." 
1. Question and Answer #8. addresses the situation in which a 
transaction that has closed becomes a Listed Transaction. Under 
the Jobs Creation Act, the statute of limitations is extended until 
one calendar year after the IRS receives proper disclosure of Listed 
Transactions. In the case of a closed transaction that becomes a 
Listed Transaction, the answer states that, until one year after 
proper disclosure to the IRS, interest must be accrued in the P&L 
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on the unrecognized tax benefit (perhaps all of the benefit because. 
the "more likely than not" threshold may not have been met) under 
the rules of FIN 48, and the tax benefit taken on the tax return will 
never be recognizable in the financial statements. As a result, each 
year the accrued interest increases and the P&L is negatively. 
affected. 
J. The memorandum states that LMSB has consulted F ASB on this 
point and F ASB agrees that this is the result. The memorandum ' 
advises that "it may be a good practice to remind taxpayers about 
this provision affecting Listed Transactions and the way they 
impact on the application of FIN 48 in their fmancial st~tements." 
k. It is clear from the memoranda that the IRS is preparing itsLMSB 
examiners to focus carefully on FIN 48 Disclosures. The 
statement that LMSB is evaluating the policy of restraint with 
respect to FIN 48 Workpapers suggests thatLMSB examiners may 
be increasing their requests for FIN 48 Workpapers. LMSB has 
created a "TAW Cadre whose members are available to assist with 
the review of documents received in response to TAW IDRs 
[information docunlent requests]. The primary objective of the 
Cadre is to assist LMSB examiners in determining whether items 
received fulfill the IDR, whether additional documents should be 
requested, and in considering the risk assessment related to the 
review of those tax accrual workpapers." . 
H. Post Textron Decision Events on Tax Accrual Workpapers - DeloWe (United 
States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F. 3d 129 (D.C. Circ. 2010)) 
1. Background: 
a. To aid examining agents in the audit of taxpayers, the IRS has 
increased requests for a taxpayer's tax accrual workpapers. These 
papers document the taxpayer's decision-making process and 
rationale for creating tax reserves for financial accounting 
purposes. Taxpayers are concerned that providing these 
dpcuments will provide the IRS with an audit roadmap. (Similar to 
the arguments against Uncertain Tax Position reporting). 
b. A taxpayer generally prepares the workpapers in connection With 
assistance from inside and outside counsel. The workpapers 
include information relating to the making of legal judgments 
relating to certain positions taken on returns. The taxpayer usually 
needs the assistance of counsel to properly estimate the audit risk 
and, if necessary, litigation risks. 
c. Taxpayers generally assert the Work Product Privilege in their 
attempts to defeat the IRS's ability to obtain these workpapers. 
The Work Product Privilege prohibits discovery of "documents 
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and tangible things ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial" when discussed with a taxpayer's representative (usually an 
attorney or accountant). 
(1) This privilege finds its origin in the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S .. 495 (1947) (where 
the Court granted protection from disclosure materials 
prepared by a party "in anticipation of litigation.") The 
disputed materials consisted of summaries of witness 
statements gathered by an attorney during trial preparation. 
(2) . In 1970, a rule was added to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to address the issue. FRCP 26(b)(3) provides 
that "a party may not discover documents and tangible 
things that are prepared. in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial or for another party or its representative." . 
(a) The rule is different from the holding in Hickman in 
. two regards. The rule does not protect from 
disclosure: 
(i) intangible work product; or 
(ii) .work product prepared by non-attorneys 
(this issue was not addressed in Hickman). 
(b) Courts generally apply the "because of' test to 
determine if the material has been prepared in. 
anticipation of litigation. 
d. As of2009, the IRS official policy is that tax accrual workpapers 
will not automatically be requested in every audit. Recent trends 
have shown that the IRS is requesting these workpapers more and 
more. In contrast, once a matter goes forward to the litigation 
phase, the IRS routinely asks for copies of tax accrual workpapers 
as part of their informal discovery. 
2. Deloitte - D.C. Circuit - Taxpayer Victory (United States v. Deloitte LLP, 
610 F. 3d 129 (D.C. Circ. 2010)). 
a. Rationale: In contrast to Textron, the D.C. Circuit focused on the 
content of the materials at dispute. The D.C. Circuit determined 
that Deloitte's tax accrual workpapeis contained work product· 
which' includes the thoughts and opinions of counsel developed in 
anticipated of litigation. 
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b. The Court also stated that the disclosure of the work product to the 
taxpayer's independent auditor did not constitute a waiver of the 
privilege because Deloitte was not a potential adversary and a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality was expected. 
c. The IRS did not seek Supreme Court review in this 'case. 
3. Wells Fargo - Dual Purpose Documents (District Court Minnesota) 
a. On September 1,2010, Wells Fargo & Co. asked the court to ' 
quash a subpoena issued to its independent auditor, KPMG LLP 
relating to requests for tax accrual workpapers. 
(1) The summons asked for "any and all analyses, 
computations, opinions, notes, summaries, discussiohS~ and 
other documents relating to such reserves and any 
footnotes. " 
(2) Wells Fargo & Co is attempting to protect from disclosure 
the following items from its files and from the files of its 
auditor: 
(a) Company memoranda based on advice of in-house 
tax controversy attorneys identifying and evaluating 
the legal merits of its UTPs and selecting a reserve 
percentage b~ed on the likelihood of settlement; 
(b) Meeting agendas and emails identifying and/or 
evaluating litigation risks associated with its UTPs;' 
and 
(c) Spreadsheets, reports, and electronic data files 
identifying UTPs with potential analysis relating to 
evaluating appropriate legal tax reserve percentages 
and reserve amounts. 
(3) The question for the Court is whether the work product 
doctrine applies to dual purpose documents prepared by 
taxpayers to support their F ASB Interpretation No. 48 tax 
reserves. The tax reserves would not be necessary put for 
the anticipated litigation. 
(4) Government's Position - the documents were prepared in 
the ordinary course of business as part of Wells Fargo's 
obligations under regulatory requirements not for 
anticipated litigation. ,The government also asserts that any 
work product privilege was waived when Wells Fargo 
provided the documents to its auditors. 
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(5) The District Court held a four-day evidentiary hearirig 
beginning on July 25, 2011. The parties are awaiting a final 
decision. 
4. Effect ofUTP Reporting on the Tax Accrual Workpaper Issue 
a. On September 24,2010, the IRS released materials relating to·the 
new reporting requirements for uncertain tax positions (UTPs) 
including the final form of Schedule UTP. 
b. For 2010, private or public companies with total assets of$100 
million or more that issue or are included in audited fmancial 
statements and that file a Form 1120, 1120-L, or 1120-PC must file 
a Schedule UTP. The schedule will be phased ill for taxpayers with 
assets of less than $100 million. 
c. Schedule UTP requires filers to rank UTPs by the amount of 
reserves. 
d~ Schedule UTP requires a concise description of relevant facts 
affecting the tax treatment of the position and infoimation to 
apprise the IRS of the identity of the tax position and the nature of 
the issue. The statement does not have to include the rationale for 
the filing of the UTP. 
e. The IRS plans to process Schedule UTP through an established 
centralized process under LB&I. This will enable LB&I to select 
issues and returns for audit. 
f. It is to be seen whether the reporting requirements for Uncertain 
Tax Positions will moot future disputes over tax accrual 
workpapers. 
III. IRS GIDDANCE -- WHAT DEGREE 'OF DEFERENCE AND WHEN CAN 
TAXPAYERS RELY UPON IT? 
A.. Six~Y ear Statute of Limitations - Beard; Home Concrete; Grapevine; etc. 
1. Background: 
a . Code Section 6501(a) generally provides that a valid assessment of 
income tax liability may not be made more than 3 years after the 
later of the date of the tax return was filed or the due date of the tax 
return . 
. b. Code Section 6501 (e)(1)(A) allows a 6 year statute of limitations 
on assessment when a taxpayer "omits from gross income'.' an 
amount that is greater than 25% of the amount of gross income 
stated in the return. . '. 
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c. Text of Code Section 6501(e) 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection ( c) -
(1) Income taxes. In the case of any tax imposed by subtitle A-
(A) General rule. If the taxpayer omits from gross income an 
amount properly includible therein and-
(i) such amount is in excess of25 percent of the amount of 
gross income stated in the return, or 
(ii) such amount-
(I) is attributable to one or more assets with respect to 
which information is required to be reported under 
section 6038D (or would be so required if such 
section were applied without regard to the dollar 
threshold specified in subsection (a) thereof and 
without regard to any exceptions provided pursuant 
to subsection (h)(I) thereof), and 
(II) is in excess of $5,000, 
the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such 
tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after 
the return was filed. 
(B) Determination of gross income'. For purposes of 
subparagraph (A)-
(i) in the case of a trade or business, the term "gross 
income" means the total of the amounts received or 
accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such 
amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to 
diminution by the cost of such sales or services; and 
(ii) in determining the amount omitted from gross income, 
there shall not be taken into account any amount which 
is omitted from gross income stated in the return if such 
amount is disclosed ,in the return, or in a statement 
attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise 
.the SecretarY of the nature and' amount of such item. 
(C) Constructive dividends. If the taxpayer omits from gross 
income an amount properly includible therein under section 
951(a), the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for 
the collection of such tax may be done without assessing, at 
any time within 6 years after the return was filed. 
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2. Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) 
a. Background: Real estate developer that miscalculated profits from 
the sale of realty by erroneously including an excessive itein of 
cost of the realty. 
b. Issue: Under the predecessor statute to 6501(e), did the taxpayer 
omit from gross income some taxable item? 
c. Holding: The extended period of limitations in applies to situations . 
where specific income receipts have been "left out" in the 
computation of gross income, and not something put in and 
overstated. 
d. Rationale -
(1) When a taxpayer omits an item, the IRS is at a 
disadvantage in detecting errors. In such cases the return 
on its face provides no clued to the existence of an omitted 
item~ However, in an overstated basis issue the face of the 
return the Commissioner is not at a disadvantage because 
the basis is disclosed. 
3. 1954 Code Changed/Clarified Code Section 275(c) (now 6501(e)) 
a. Congress made modifications to the 3-year/6-year issue in .. 
response to 'court decisions. In each instance, Congress limited the 
6:-year statute to cases in which the taxpayer left out items of 
income. 
(1), New Heading on Code Subsection- "Substantial Omission 
ofItems" replaced "Omission fromGross Income." 
. (2) Exception from6-year statute if adequate disclosure is 
provided. 
(3) Redefmed gross profit as including only the revenue side. 
4. IRS Litigation Position: Treasury Regulation 301.6501(e)-I(e) (T.D. 
9511). 
a. Background: In December 2010, the IRS issued final regulations 
which held that an understated amount of gross income resulting 
from an overstatement of unrecovered cost or other basis is an 
omission of gross income for purposes of the 6-year period for 
assessing tax. . 
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'(I) IRS disagrees that the holding of Colony applies to Section 
6501 (e)(1 )(A). The IRS takes the position that when 
Congress enacted the 1954 Code, it limited what became 
the holding of Colony under the 1934 Code. 
(2) The Reguhltions provide that any overstatement of basis 
that results in an understatement of gross income under 
Code Section 61(a) is an omission from gross income under 
Code Section 6501 (e)(l)(A). 
b. Validity of Regulations under Mayo (Mayo Foundation For 
Medical Residents V. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
(1) On January 11,2011, the Supreme Court addressed the 
validity of Treasury regulations dealing with employment 
taxes for medical residents and other student-employees., 
. (2) Issue: Whether medical residents are exempt from FICA 
taxes based on the exception for service performed in the 
employ of a school, college, or University if such service is 
performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly 
attending classes at such school, college, or university. 
(3) The TreasUry regulations promulgated in 19~ 1 provide 'that 
the exception only applies to students who work for their 
schools as incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a 
course of study. See Treas. Reg. §31.3121(b)(10)-~(d). 
(4) In 2004, Treasury amended the regulations so that the 
exception only applies only when the educational aspect 
predominates over the service aspe<;t. Specifically, student 
working a full-time schedule (scheduled more than 40 
hours a week) are not within the exception. 
(5) The Mayo Foundation and the University of Minnesota 
challenged the validity of the amended regulation. The 
. District Court agreed in part relying on the National 
Muffier decision (National Muffier Dealers Ass'n Inc. v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979)). (Mayo Found. For 
Med. Res. v. United States, 503F. supp. 2d 1164 (D. Minn. 
2007). . 
(6) However, the 8th Circuit r~versed the lower court ruling 
rmding that the regulation was valid under the Chevron 
standard (Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) (Mayo Found. 
For Med. Res. v. United States, 568 F. 3d 675 (8th Cir. 
2009). 
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(7) The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the circuit court 
opinion (131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) and held: 
(a) Chevron, not National Muffler controls; 
(b) Section 3121(b)(10) is silent or ambiguous as to the 
de:firiition of the student exception; and 
(c) The amended regulations reasonably interpret 
section 3121(b)(10) .. 
c. Application of Mayo/Chevron. 
(1) Determination 
(a) Step 1 - Did Congress have an intention on the 
precise question at issue.? If so, that intent is 
controlling. . If the regulation takes a different 
position, the regulation is invalid. 
(i) . Ask -- Is the statutory provision ambiguous? 
(ii) Ask - Can the judge look to other guidance 
to determine Congressional intent such as 
legislative history or should the focus be 
solely on the text of the statute? 
(b) Step 2 - If Congress did not have an intention on 
the precise question at issue, then a government , 
agency can adopt ,any reasonable interpretation. ' 
(i) Ask - Is the regulation reasonable 
interpretation of the statute? 
(2) Generally, for a taxpayer to be successful in challenging the 
validity of a regulation, the taxpayer must win at Step 1. If 
the statutory provision is found to be ambiguous, the 
burden on the taxpayer to show that the interpretation is 
unreasonable is quite steep. However, it is not impossible 
to convince a, court that the agency determination is 
unreasonable. 
5. Supreme Court -- Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States 
(Docket No. 11-139). 
a. On September 27,2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
Many people were surprised that the Supreme Court chose to select 
this case as opposed to the taxpayer's petition in Beard v. ' 
Commissioner. Beard had been decided earlier and had the 
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support of the u.s. Justice Department. However, Home Concrete 
addressed a wider range of issues in its opinion including the 
validity of the Treasury regulations (T.D. 9511) issued under 
Section 6501(e). 
b. Issue Before the Supreme Court: 
(1) Whether an understatement of gross income attributable to 
an overstatement of basis in sold property is a gross. 
omission that triggers the six-year assessment period. 
(~) Whether final regulations promulgated by Treasury are 
subject to j1,ldicial deference. 
c. Facts: 
(1) Robert Pierce and Stephen Chandler owned Home Oil and 
Coal Company. They pl~ed to sell the business. Prior to 
engaging in a sales transaction, the two. owners participated 
in a variety of transactions including short sales of U.S. 
Treasury Bonds. These transactions were designed to 
increase their basis in certain assets and decrease their tax 
liability upon the actual sale of the business. 
(2) When they-initiated the sales of the u.S. Treasury bonds, 
they transferred the short sale proceeds and margin cash to 
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC ("LLC") as capital 
contributions. The contributions created an outside basis in 
the LLC. When the LLC closed the short sale transactions 
by purchasing and returning aimost identical U.S. Treasury 
bonds to the open market. 
(3) Home Oil & Coal Company transferred all of its business 
assets to the LLC as a capital contribution. 
(4) . Pierce and Chandler transferred percentages of their 
respective partnership interest in the LLC to Home Oil· as a 
capital contribution. 
(5) LLC sold substantially all of its assets to a third-party 
purchaser. 
(6) On its 1999 tax return, the LLC made a Section 754 
election to adjust or step up its inside basis to equal the 
taxpayer's outside basis in the LLC. The LLC then 
adjUsted its inside basis and as a result reported a modest 
gain on the sale of its assets. . 
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(7) On September 7, 2006, the IRS issued a Final Partnership 
Administrative Adjustment ("FP AA"). In the FP AA, the 
IRS did not allow the basis step-up, which resulted in a 
. substantial increase in the LLC's gain on the sale of the 
assets. 
(a) The IRS rational for the adjustment was that the 
partnership was formed and availed of solely for 
purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating 
basis in the partnership interest. 
(8) Home Concrete paid the amount due and filed a refund suit 
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North 
Carolina· 
(9) The Taxpayers alleged that the FP AA was barred by the 
Code Section 6501(a) 3-year limitations period. 
d. District ColJrl's Holding (Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. U.S. 
(E.D. NC 2008) - Held in Favor of the IRS: 
. (a) Holding: Granted partial summary judgment in the 
IRS's favor. 
(b) Rationale: Held that where a taxpayer overstates 
basis, and as a result, leaves an amount out of gross 
income, the taxpayer omits an amount from gross 
income for purposes of Code Sec 6501 (e)(1 )(A). 
(c) Therefore, the 6-year statute applied, not the 3-year. 
e. Fourth Circuit's Holding (Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. 
United States, 634 F. 3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011) - Held in Favor of the 
Taxpayer: 
(a) Holding: Overruled District Court and found that. 
the 3-year statute of limitations not the 6-year 
statute applied, which meant that the FP AA was 
untimely. 
(b) Rationale: Held that the Supreme Court holding in . 
Colony continued to apply to Code Section 
6501(e)(1)(A) and that an overstated basis in 
property is not an omission from gross income that 
extends the period of limitation. 
(c) Home Concrete's overstated basis in the short sale 
proceeds did not trigger the 6-year statute of 
limitations. 
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(d) The Colony decision construed the phrase "omits 
from gross income" separate from being dependent· 
on the taxpayer's identity as a trade or business 
selling goods or services. The language of the 
statute that was at issue in Colony is identical to the 
language at issue in Home Concrete. 
(e) The 4th Circuit held that because the Treasury 
Regulation at issue was interpreting language that 
the Supreme Court held to be unambiguous when it 
decided Colony, the regulation was not entitled to 
controlling deference. 
f. Supreme Court Revie~: Effect of Mayo 
(1) ·In Mayo, the Supreme Court gave the governme~t wide 
latitude when regulations are issued .. There is confusion 
regarding how broad these powers extend. Can the IRS do 
whatever it wants when it issues regulations? Did Congress 
intend to permit the IRS to issue retroactive regulations 
with such a bi:oad scope when used to bolster a litigation 
position? 
(2) Does Colony still apply post Chevron/Mayo? 
(3) Step 1 - -Will the Supreme Court find the statute 
ambiguous? 
(a) In aiding their determination, will the Supreme 
Court look past the statutory provision to legislative 
history and Congressional reports? 
. (4) Step 2 ~ If it is ambiguous, are the retroactive regulations 
reasonable? 
(a) Do the regulations meet the Administrative 
. Procedures Act" standards - did Treasury provide 
adequate explanation for the regulations? 
g. Taxpayer's Response to Government's Certiorari Petition 
(1) Argued that legislative changes to section 6501(e) have 
never overruled Colony, which remains good law becaUSe 
it is not limited to goods or services. 
(2) . Argued that the final regulations are not applicable even if 
the six-year statute applies because the retroactive nature of 
the regulations violates due process and does not deserve 
judicial deference. 
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6. Status of Other Cases -
a. Court of Appeals - Government Wins 
(1) Seventh Circuit- Beard v. Commissioner, 633 F. 3d 616 
(7th Circ. 2011). 
(a) Found Colony not to be controlling, did not reach 
issue of deference to the regulations. 
(b) No mention of Mayo, even though decided and 
opinion written after Mayo. 
(2) Tenth Circuit - Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F. 
3d 1362 (Fed. Cir~ 2009). 
(a) Applied Mayo to permit deference for issued 
regulations notwithstanding pending litigation. 
(b) Note that litigation in the Federal Circuit relating to 
a prior tax year, Salman Ranch (573 F. 3d 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) won on the same issue. The 10th 
Circuit said that the "rules"ohad changed in the 
interim and held that collateral estoppel did not 
apply. 
(3) District of Columbia - Intermountain Insurance Services of 
Vail, LLC v. Comm'r. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12476 (D.C. 
Cir.2011). 
(a) Found statute to be ambiguous by·exploring Colony 
decision and legislative history. 
(b) Applied Mayo to permit deference for issued 
regulations notwithstanding pending litigation. 
(4) Federal Circuit - Gra:gevine Im:gorts~ Ltd. v. United States, 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14144 (Fed: Cir. 2011). 
° (a) Statutory language was ambiguous. Treasury ° 
regulations were reasonable interpretation of the 
statute. 
(b) Relied solely on Chevron and Brand X. Mayo not 
mentioned. 
b. Court of Appeals - Taxpayer Victories 
(1) Fourth Circuit - Home Concrete (See above). 0 
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(2) 
(3) 
(a) Found statute unambiguous. 
Fifth Circuit - Burks v. United States, 633 F. 3d 347 (5th 
Cir.2011). ' ' 
(a) Found statute unambiguous, Mayo not applicable. 
Assuming statute ambiguous, court expressed 
concern over the retroactive litigation position of 
the new regulations asserted by the IRS. 
Ninth Circuit - Bakersfield Energy Partners. LP v. 
Comm'r, 568 F. 3d 767 (~th Cir. 2009). 
(a) Case decided prior to the issuance of the new 
Treasury regulation. Also, the case was decided 
before the Mayo decision. 
(b) Held that Colony controlled the case and that 
overstated basis was not a gross omission. 
(c) Stated that the IRS may issue regulations that run . 
contrary to a Supreme Court holding provided that 
the statute is ambiguous and the regulations are 
reasonable (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n 
v. Brand X Internet Servs. , 545 U.S. 967(2005)). 
However, they were bound by'the decision in 
Colony. ' 
B. Non-precedential guidance - e;g., Directives. F AQs; 
1. Increasingly Utilized; Examples include: 
a. Success-Based Fees - On July 26,2011, LB&I issued a directive 
directing agents not to pursue a taxpayer's treatment of success-
based fees paid or incurred in a transaction described in § 1.263(a)-
5(e)(3) of the Income Tax Regulations irrtaxable years ended 
before April 8, 2011, where the taxpayer's ooginal return position 
is to capitalize such fees to the transaction in an amount of at least 
30 percent of the total success-based fees incurred by the taxpayer 
With the respect to the transaction. 
b. . Economic Substance Doctrine - On July 15,2011 LB&I issued 
internal directive with guidelines related to when it is appropriate 
to apply the codified economic substance doctrine and penalties. 
c. Gift Tax on 501(c)(4) Contributions - On July 7,2011 LB&I 
issued an internal,directive without guidance, directing agents not 
to pursue gift tax audits related to 501(c)(4) Contributions until 
further guidance is provided. 
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d. Strict Liability Economic Substance Doctrine Penalty - On 
September 14, 2010, LMSB issued a directive requiring that any 
assertion of the strict liabiHty penalty be approved at the DFO 
level. 
e. Gain Recognition Agreements - On July 26; 20.10, LMSB issued·a 
memorandum titled "Directive on Examination Action With 
Respect to Certain Gain Recognition Agreements" with a 
procedure for taxpayers that timely filed a document that 
"purports" to be. a GRA regarding an initial transfer but does not 
satisfy the requirements of reg. section 1.367(a)-8(c)(2).· 
f. Tiered Issue Industry Director Directives - ~rovide guidance to 
agents on how to examine tiered issues. 
2. Musfbe Adhered to By IRS Personnel 
a. IRS personnel are expected to follow these directives - "LMSB 
Examiners are expected to follow guidelines and instructions 
provided in LMSB Directives. If the Directive is jointly issued 
with another operating division, then examiners of both divisions 
must follow the Directive." IRM 4.51.2.6(5). 
3. Taxpayers Cannot Rely On Them 
a. Directives Constitute Infonnal Guidance 
b. Generally only administrative in nature; Does not address IRS 
legal position 
c. Not recognized as authoritative 
(1) For penalty purposes - Directives are not specifically 
identified·in reg. section 1.6662-4( d)(3)(iii) as authority 
that constitute "substantial authority" for penalty purposes. 
(2) For Circular 230 purposes. 
4. Can Sometimes Mutate Into Proposed Regulations. 
IV. TAX OPINIONS AND PENALTIES POST -CANAL 
A. Canal C01J?oration (Canal Com. v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010)) 
1. Issue - Issue was whether anti-abuse regulations of Treas. Reg. §1.752-2G) 
applied to a debt-fmanced distribution transaction. 
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2. Facts: 
a Fonnation of Partnership - Georgia Pacific (GP) and WISCO (a 
subsidiary of Chesapeake) fonned Georgia-Pacific Tissue LLC 
(LLC) as the vehicle for a joint venture. GP and WISCO treated 
the LLC as a partnership for tax purposes. Both partners 
contributed the assets of their respective tissue businesses to the 
LLC. GP transferred to the LLC its tissue business assets with an 
agreed value of $376.4 million in exchange for a 95-percent ' 
interest in the LLC. WISCO contributed to the LLC all of the 
assets of its tissue business with an agreed value of $775 million in 
exchange for a 5-percent interest in the LLC. 
b. ' Debt-Financed Distribution - The LLC borrowed $755.2 million 
from Bank of America (BOA) on the same day it received the 
contributions from GP and WISCO. The LLC immediately 
transferred the loan proceeds to Chesapeake's (WISCO's parent) 
bank account as a special cash distribution. 
c. Guarantee and Indemnification - OP guaranteed payment of the 
BOA loan, and WISCO agreed to indemnify GP for any principal 
payments GP might have to make under its guaranty. 
d. LLC's Assets - The LLC had approximately $400 million in net 
worth based on the parties' combined initiai contribution of assets 
($1.151 billion) less the BOA loan ($755:2 million), and it had a 
debt to equity ratio of around 2, to 1. The LLC assumed most of 
WISCO's'liabilities. Chesapeake and WISCO both indemnified GP 
and held it hannIess for any costs and claims that it might incur 
with respect to any retained liabilities of WISCO. 
e. WISCO's Assets - WISCO's assets following the transaction 
included an intercompany note with a face value of$151 million 
and a corporate jet worth approximately $6 million. WISCO had a 
net worth, excluding its LLC interest, of approximately $157 
million. This represented 21 percent of its maximum exposure on 
the indemnity. 
3. Opinion - The Court determined that the anti-abuse rules ofTreas. Reg. 
§1.752-2G) applied to the debt-fmanced distribution transaction. 
a. Legal Background 
(1) Contributions and Distributions to Partnerships are Tax 
Free - The Court first recognized that contributions to and 
distributions from partnerships are generally tax-free 
events. See generally IRC §§721, 731. 
26 
(2) Disguised Sale Rule - Section 707(a)(2)(B), however, 
provides the 'disguised sale rule' exception to this general 
rule. There, when a partner contributes property to a 
partnership and soon thereafter receives a distribution of 
money or other consideration from the partnership, a 
disguised sale, as opposed to a tax-free distribution, may be 
deemed to have occurred. 
(3) Debt-Financed Distribution Exception to Disguised Sale 
Rule - The taxpayer in Canal argued that the distribution to 
Chesapeake was not a disguised sale because itmet one of 
the exceptions to the disguised sale rules - the Debt-
Financed Distribution Exception. Under this exception, 
certain debt-fmanced distributions are excluded in 
detennining whether a partner received "money or other 
consideration" for disguised sale purposes. This includes a 
partner's share ofa partnership's recourse liabilities, 
provided the partner bears the economic risk of loss 
associated with that liability. . 
(4) Anti-Abuse Rule - The anti-abuse rule provides that a 
partner's obligation to make a payment on a partnership's 
recourse liabilities may be disregarded if (1) the facts and 
circumstances indicate that a principal purpose of the' 
arrangeIllent between the parties is to eliminate the 
partner's risk of loss or to create a facade of the partner's 
b~aring the economic risk of loss with respect to the 
obligation, or (2) the facts and circumstances of the 
transaction evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the 
obligation. 
b. Court's Analysis 
(1) Indemnity Limited Risk - The Court first determined that 
the indemnification ofthe.OP guarantee of the LLC debt 
limited the risk of loss to only WISCOs remaining assets -
Chesapeake bore no risk of loss. . 
(2) WISCO's Assets- The Court determined that WISCO's 
assets were minimal relative to the indemnified amount and 
as a result the "agreement to indemnify OP's guaranty 
lacked economic substance and afforded no real protection 
to OP." 
(3) Conclusion - The anti-abuse rules applied, effectively 
rejecting application of the debt-fmanced distribution to the 
disguised sale rule. 
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B. Penalty - Court also considered whether a section 6662 penalty applied to the 
transaction. . 
1. . Raised During Litigation:.... Although the assertion of a penalty to the 
transaction was not unique, the manner in which it was fIrst raised was. 
Rather than the penalty being asserted in the Notice, the penalty was fIrst 
raised during the litigation. 
a. Ability to Raise New Issues in Tax Court- The IRS may raise new 
issues during litigation in Tax Court that are not present in the 
Notice. 
b. Tax Court Chief Judge Colvin's Remarks - Commenting on the 
Canal case in oral remarks made at the 2011 ALI-ABA course 
entitled How To Handle a Tax Controversy at theIRS & in Court: 
From Administrative Audit Through Litigation on September 16, 
2011 in Washington, DC, Chief Judge of the Tax Court, John O . 
. Colvin acknowledged that the Goven'nnent is not precluded from 
raising new issues during litigation that were not addressed in the . 
Notice, including penalties. 
c. Burden of Proof - When the Government raises a new issue during 
litigation,the burden of proof generally falls to the Government 
with respect to those new issues. 
2. Reliance on Experts - Court rejected reasonable reliance oD. accounting 
fIrm's 'should' opinion. 
a. Fee - Court suggested that the $800,000 flat fee paid for the 
opinion indicated that the advice therein was unreasonable. In . 
making this suggestion, the Court found that the draft of the· 
opinion submitted at trial contained typographical errors, was 
disorganized and was incomplete, and that as a r~sult it must have 
been hastily drafted. In.describing why a should opinion was 
issued, the c.oi:rrt·asserted that "The only explanation that makes 
sense to the Court is that no lesser level of comfort would have 
commanded the $800,000 fIxed fee that Chesapeake paid for the 
opinion." . 
b. . Legal Reasoning - Court determined that ''the opinion was riddled 
with questionable conclusions and unreasonable assumptions." 
c. Court's Conclusion - Based on what it found to be questionable 
conclusions and unreasonable assumptions, the court concluded 
. that "Chesapeake's tax position did not warrant a "should" opinion 
because of the numerous assumptions and dubious legal 
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conclusions in the haphazard draft opinion that has been admitted 
into the record. Further, we fmd it inherently tinreasonable for 
Chesapeake to have relied on an analysis based on the specious 
legal assumptions.'~ 
d. Personal Identification of Opinion Drafter - The Court singled-out 
and identified by name and employer the drafter of the opinion 
issued to Chesapeake. 
v. APPEALS -- CHANGES IN COORDINATION OF TECHNICAL ISSUES 
A. Practitioners Concerns: Practitioners continue to be concerned about Appeals' 
coordination of tax issues along with other originating functions at IRS. 
1. Although more subtle than a direct violation of ex parte prohibitions, 
coordination jeopardizes the appearance of Appeals independence given 
the level of interaction. 
B. IRS Response: IRS appears to recogriize' these concerns and may be attempting to ' 
mollify practitioners concerns in several ways. ' , 
1. IRS has announced that Appeals will no longer formally sit on issue 
management teams. 
2. Commenting on Appeals' coordination of technical issues at the 2011 
ALI-ABA course entitled How To Handle a Tax Controversy at the IRS & 
in Court: From Administrative Audit Through Litigation on September 15, 
2011 in Washington, DC~ National Director Of Appeals, Chris Wagner,' 
stated that there had been no new issues identified for technical 
coordination during FY 2011 and that appeals had withdrawn 18 issues 
from the coordinated technical guidance list (which requires the 
concurrence of an Appeals Technical Guidance Coordinator to approve 
the terms of settlement). 
, C. Appeals - Ex Parte 
1. Ex Parte Background 
a. Sectioi11001(a) ofRRA 1998 directs IRS commissioner to ensure: 
"an independent appeals function within the Internal Revenue 
Service, including the prohibition in the plan of ex parte 
communications between appeals officers and other Ihternal 
Revenue Service employees to the extent that such 
communications appear to compromise the independence of the 
appeals, officers." 
(1) Comports with Appeals' Mission - This comports with 
Appeals' fundamental mission ''to resolve tax 
controversies, without litigation, on a basis which is fair 
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and impartial to both the Government and the taxpayer and 
in a manner that will enhance voluntary compliance and 
public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the 
Service." Internal Revenue Manual 8.1.1.1(2) (2003). 
b. The current ex parte guidelines are contained in Rev. Proc. 2000-
43, which fmalized rules ftrst proposed in Notice 99-50. 
(1) Purpose of Rev. Proc. 2000-43 - Approach taken therein is 
to "accommodate the overall interests of tax administration, 
while preserving operational features that are vital to 
Appeals case resolution processes within the structure of 
the IRS and ensuring more open lines of communication 
between Appeals and the taxpayer/representative." Rev. 
Proc. 2000-43, §2.· . 
(2) Protect Appeals Independence - Guidelines are intended to 
preclude written or oral ex parte communications between 
Appeals and originating functions that could jeopardize the 
appearance of App~als' independence. 
(3) Substantive Communications Only - Communications that 
are ministerial, administrative, or procedural in nature are 
not precluded by the Guidelines .. 
(4) Reasonable Opportunity to Participate - Communications 
are not ex parte if the taxpayer is provided a "reasonable 
opportunity" to be present. 
(5) Enforcement/Sanctions - Neither Congress in Section 
1001(a) of the RRA 1998, nor Rev. Proc. 2000-43 provide 
for any form of sanctions when ex parte violations occur. 
c. IRS' misperception of, and internal procedures to handle, ex parte 
guidelines jeopardize Appeals' independence. 
(1) AdministrativelMinisterial - IRS classiftes ex parte 
communications as administrative or ministerial when in 
reality they may be at least partially substantive. 
(2) Harmless Error - IRS asserts communications result in 
harmless error. 
(3) 
(4) 
Good Faith - IRS asserts communications are made in 
good faith (Le., they are intended as factual development) 
Lack of Procedures and Processes - No·procedure for 
disclosures to occur, and no process for when a disclosure. 
does occur .. ' 
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2. Notice 2011-62 - On July 19,2011, the IRS proposed for public comment 
updates to the Appeals ex parte guidelines contained in Rev. Proc. 2000-
43. . 
a. Convert the guidelines into narrative format from question-and-
answer format. 
b. Incorporate much of the guidance issued in Rev. Proc. 2000-43. 
c. Adopts a series of guiding principles that, in theory, are designed 
to help with the interpretation and understanding of the ex parte 
restrictions. 
d. New and Continuing CaUses for Concern: 
(1) Little Taxpayer~Favorable Change - Little in the new 
guidance provides for new restrictions or rules that favor . 
taxpayers. Old concerns remain, and additional new 
concerns have arisen. 
(2) Self-Enforcement - No procedures have been established . 
by which a taxpayer can inquire or test whether an 
improper ex parte communication has occurred, nor are any 
remedies established for violations. Taxpayers should 
continue to be vigilant in inquiring as to potential 
prohibited communications and in requesting to participate 
in all communications of which they are given advance 
notice. 
(3) Chief Counsel Field Attorney Communications - Appeals' 
communications with Chief Counsel field attorney advising 
the originating IRS function is an ex parte communication 
only if the field attorney "personally" advised or advocated 
on the issue. Whether this was the case now dependent on 
an internal assessment (one not likely to be shared with the 
taxpayer) of the "extent and nature of the field attorney's 
involvement." This is a change from the old rules of Rev. 
Proc. 2000-43 in which Appeals was not permitted to· 
communicate "ex parte regarding an issue in a case pending 
before them with Counsel field attorneys who have 
previously provided advice on that issue in the case to the 
IRS employees who made the determination Appeals is 
reviewing. " 
(4) Chief Counsel Recommendations of Settlement Ranges -
New guidelines state that Appeals officers are responsible 
for independently evaluating the strengths and weaknesses 
. of the specific issues in the case and need not follow 
Counsel's advice. This is a departure from the. stronger 
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VI. TEFRA LITIGATION 
language in prior guidelines which provided that "Counsel 
attorneys will not provide advice that includes 
recommendations of settlement ranges- for an issue in a case 
pending before Appeals or for the case as a whole." 
A. BUSH v. U.S., 108 AFTR 2d 2011-5941 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
B. Issue in Bush - Whether Government was required to issue deficiency notices 
before making post-settlement partner assessments stemming from partnership 
losses and at-risk adjustments. 
C. Facts ,- Two cases were consolidated for trial and considered in tandem on 
Appeal. 
1. Taxpayers were part of a partnership for which the IRS had issued FP AAs 
for the 1983-1986 years. While Tax Court proceedings related to those 
FP AAs were ongoing, taxpayers settled with the IRS by,entering into 
closing agreements. 
2. The closing agreements expressly stated that they did not make any 
adjustments to partnership items. The agreements addressed the right to 
claim partnership losses on individual tax returns. The agreements 
provided that the settling partners were only entitled to 'claim partnership 
losses to the extent of their "at risk" amount. They also contained 
, stipulations as to how to calculate the exact dollar amount for each settling 
partner that was "at risk" for the relevant tax years. Once these 
agreements were executed, the Tax Court dismisse~ the taxpayers from 
, the partnership proceediD.gs. 
3. In 2000, th¢ IRS issued Notices of Adjustment for the taxpayers' 1985, 
1986, and 1987 tax returns. The Notices disallowed a significant portion 
of the losses the Bushes had claimed connected to the two partnerships. ' 
Two weeks later, the IRS assessed the taxpayers for those amounts. The 
assessed amounts were based on the calculations contained in the closing 
agreements. At no point did the IRS issue a Notice of Deficiency related 
to the assessed amounts. 
4. The taxpayers paid the assessed tax and interest and two years later 
initiated refund proceedings with the IRS seeking to recover that payment 
, on grounds that the IRS failed to provide them deficiency notices. The IRS 
denied their claims, and the taxpayers filed suit in the Court of Federal 
Claims; 
D. Procedural History 
1. Court of Federal Claims - The Court of Federal Claims sided with the 
government. It held that the post-settlement adjustments were 
32 
"computational adjustments" as that tenn is defined in the Tax Code and 
that none of the Tax Code provisions requiring a Notice of Deficiency 
applied because of the computational nature of the adjustment. 
2. First Federal Circuit Opinion':'" A divided panel affmned the Court of 
Federal Claims, but on different grounds. The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that the adjustments were not "computational adjustments" but instead the 
failure to provide notice was hannless under the federal hannless error 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. . 
E. En Banc Federal Circuit Opinion· 
1. The Federal Circuit adopted the position of the Court of Federal Claims. 
The Court found that "[a]fter the settlement, there was nothing to do other 
than plug numbers into a fonnula to determine any change in tax liability." 
The Taxpayer's arguments that: (1) such a holding impermissibly widened 
the purview of computational adjustments, (2) such a holding would 
render the second sentence of·I.R.C. § 6231(a)(6) (the definition of . 
"computational adjustment") superfluous, and (3) such a holding 
conflicted with regulations on computational adjustments were 
unpersuasive to the Court. . 
2. The Federal Circuit also addressed the Taxpayer's argument that the at-
risk amounts determined by the settlements involved partner-level factual 
detenninations that triggered the notice requirement. In so doing, the· 
Federal Circuit again agreed with·the Court of Federal Claims that in the 
cases at bar, while the at-risk amount may have been affected items with a 
nonpartnership component, there were no partner-level determinations .. 
As a resUlt, "all that remained after the settlements was to apply the values 
from the taxpayers' returns.to the stipulated computations in the settlement 
agreement and directly assess the tax. There was no need to collect any 
additional infonnation from the taxpayers or make any factual 
determinations." This militated against the need for a Notice of 
Deficiency. 
VII. TEFRA LITIGATION - PENALTIES / SALA V~ U.S., 613 F. 3d 1249 (10TH CIR. 
2010) 
A. Issue in Sala - Whether Government Was entitled to offset excess interest 
payments due to taxpayer with Section 6662 penalty owed but not assessed where 
overpayment did not exist and where, in any event, taxpayer had filed a qualified 
amended return. . 
B. Facts 
1. In 2000, taxpayer realized more than $60 million in income related to the 
sale of stock options. Taxpayer invested all but $9 million of this income 
in fixed income assets. The remaining $9 million was invested in a 
foreign currency investment program. 
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2. The $9 million foreign currency investment resulted in the acquisition of 
24 foreign 'currency options, consisting of both long and short positions. 
The net cost was approximately $725,000. 
3. In November, 2000, taxpayer fonned Solid Currencies, Inc. {"Solid" or 
"Solid Currencies"}-a Delaware S Corporation in which taxpayer was 
the sole shareholder. Taxpayer then transferred the 24 options, plus 
approximately $8 million in cash, to Soli<;l and then from Solid to 
Deerhurst Investors, GP, in exchange for a partnership interest. Deerhurst 
Investors, GP was liquidated prior to December 31, 2000. 
4. Upon liquidation ofDeerhurstGP, Solid received a share of the proceeds. 
Solid transferred its share of the Deerhurst GP proceeds to a different 
en~ity where the funds continued to be used forinvestment purposes 
through 2004. 
5. Taxpayer's 2000 return reported an ordinary loss from a trade or business 
of $60,000,000: This loss was achieved by disregarding short options as 
liabilities for purposes of establishing partnership basis. Thus, upon 
transfer of the 24 foreign currency options from taxpayer to Solid and then 
to Deerhurst GP, Solid's basis in Deerhurst GP was increased by the value 
of the long options, but was not offset by the cost of th'e short options. 
6. Upon liquidation of Deerhurst GP, Solid received a portion of Deerhurst 
GP's liquidated assets equal to the proportionate size of Solid's basis. Solid 
claimed to have received approximately $8 million in cash and two 
foreign currency contracts. Under the Tax Code, the foreign currency 
contracts were considered to be "property" at transfer. The value of the 
foreign exchange contracts distributed to Solid, therefore, was claimed to 
be approximately $61 million-$69 million (Solid's original basis in 
, Deerhurst GP) less the $8 million in cash. When Solid sold the foreign 
currency contracts, its loss was equal tO,the $61 million dollar value of the 
contracts, offset by any profit received from their sale. According to 
Solid's 2000 tax return, t4e combined loss on the foreign currency 
contracts was approximately $60,000,000. 
7. In November 2003, taxpayer filed a fonn 1040X amending his 2000 
return. The amended return reported the same income amounts as the 
original return, but did not report the approximate $60,000,000 loss 
previously attributed to Solid Currencies. Taxpayer paid the resulting 
approximately $26 million in taxes, interest, and penalties. On or about 
June 18, 2004; the IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency to taxpayer, asserting 
he owed additional taxes in the amount of $22,204 due to the disallowance 
of $56,071 of losses taxpayer reported as attributable to Solid Currencies. 
The Notice of Deficiency also asserted an accuracy-related penalty in the ' 
amount of $4,400.80 for tax year 2000. 
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8: In September 2004, taxpayer filed another form 1040X for the 2000 tax 
year reclaiming the loss attributable to Solid Currencies and claiming a 
refund due of $23,727,630. 
C. District Court Opinion - Sala v. U.S., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (DC CO 2008). 
1. For a variety of reasons not particularly relevant to the penalty issues 
herein involved, the District Court ruled that the currency program giving 
rise to the tax losses that Petitioner had entered into was a valid 
transaction, thereby sustaining the tax losses. 
2. With respect to the accuracy-related penalty, the District Court determined 
that the penalty was inapplicable for two reasons: 
a. . First, the court determined that because the transaction giving rise 
to the loss was valid, there was effectively no underpayment to 
which the penalty could have attached. 
b. More interestingly, the court went on to state that "Even if 
[taxpayer] did underpay his 2000 taxes, however, the Government 
is not entitled to a penalty if [taxpayer] filed a "qualified amended 
return." 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-2(c)(2)." Such a filing would fail to 
meet the standards of a qualified amended return, however, if the 
Government had initiated an investigation of the taxpayer prior to 
the filing, or initiated an investigation of the shelter organizer. The 
Court determined that although an: investigation of the shelter 
promoter had been initiated by the, IRS, the investigation did not 
relate to the particular shelter at issue in the Sala case. As such, 
the'qualified amended return filed by the taxpayer was valid, and . 
even if a deficiency existed, an accuracy related penalty would be 
. inappropriate. 
3. Circuit'Court Opinion - Sala v. U.S., 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) .. 
a. On Appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the District Court was overturned . 
on the grounds that the underlying transaction lacked economic 
, substance and a business purpose. 
b. Despite being overturned, the Circuit Court included.afootriote 
indicating that ''the district court ruled Sala was entitled to a refund 
of more than $1.5 million in interest payments he made relating to 
his 2000 taxes and the Government represents to this court that it 
does not appeal this ruling. Neither does the Government seekto 
overturn the district court's ruling that it may not offsetthis refund 
with an accuracy related penalty. Accordingly, our decision has no 
affect on either of these aspects of the dis~ct court's judgment." 
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Thus, despite the District Court's primary holding being 
overturnedy it appears the penalty discussion related to the filing of 
a qualified amended return, and the existence of a non-transaction-
specific investigation of the shelter promoter, remains valid. 
(1) Note, however; that because District Court did not need to 
necessarily reach the qualified amended return issue 
(because it had determined a deficiency did not exist in the 
first place) one could argue the District Court's opinion 
related to the qualified amended return issue was merely 
dicta. 
c. Supreme Court - On October 3,2011, the Supreme Court 
declined to review the case rendering the 10th Circuit opinion to be 
fmal. 
D. Jurisdictional Deposit/ Prestop Holding LLC v. United States, 106 AFTR2d 
2010-7246 (Fed. Cl. 2010) 
1. Split in opinions - Split in Federal Claims Court created with J. Alegra's 
opinion in Prestop Holding LLC v. United States, 106 AFTR 2d 2010-
7246 (Fed. Cl. 2010). J. Alegra's opinion rejects 'holdings of two other 
Federal Claims Court cases: Kislev Partners, L.P. ex reI. Bahar v. United 
States, 84 Fed. Cl. 385 (2008), reh'g denied, 84 Fed. Cl. 378 (2008), and 
Russian Recovery Fund, Ltd. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 698 (2008). 
2. Issue in Prestop - Whether the deposit requirement ofIRC §6226(e)(I) 
included increases to the petitioning partner's taxes, arising from 
adjustments .made in an FP AA, but payable with respect to years 
subsequent to the year for which the FP AA was issued. 
3. Facts-' 
l 
a. Partnership made several tax-free distributions of property in 1997 
to the taxpayer/partner. The taxpayer claimed a high basis in the 
distributed property. 
b. The taxpayer sold the distributed property beginning in 1998 
through 2001, claiming tax' losses on the sale of the property due to 
the high baSis. 
c. In 2004~ the IRS issued the partnership an FP AA for the 1997 
, taxable year, the effect of which was to reduce the taxpayer's basis 
in. the distributed property. 
d. In 2005, the taxpayer petitioned the Federal Claims Court, 
submitting as a jurisdictional deposit $100. The ultimate purport~d 
tax deficiency related to the distributed property was significantly 
higher than the $100 deposited. 
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E. Legal Background 
1. IRC §6226(e)(1) provides that: 
A readjustment petition under this section may be filed in a district court 
of the United States or the Claims Court [Court of Federal Claims, see 
§902(b), P.L. 102-572] only if the partner filing the petition deposits with 
the Secretary, on or before the day the petition is filed, the amount by 
which the tax liability of the partner would be increased if the treatment of 
partnership items on the partner's return were made consistent with the . 
treatment of partnership items on the partnership return, as adjusted by the 
final partnership administrative adjustment. In the case of a petition filed 
by a 5-percent group, the requirement of the preceding sentence shall . 
apply to each member of the group. The court may by order provide that 
the jl.!risdictionalrequirements of this paragraph are satisfied where there 
has been a' good faith attempt to satisfy such requirements and any 
shortfall in the amount required to be deposited is timely corrected. 
2. Unique Aspects of Partnership Adjustments 
a. Adjustments to Income, not Tax - FP AAs only propose 
adjustments to individual items of income or deduction of the 
partnership, but do not usually compute the taxpayer's actual tax 
liability. Thus, an adjustment in an FP AA with respect to a 
particular year mayor may not correlate to the partner's ultimate 
tax liability for the same year. 
(1) Examples of situations in which an adjustment to a 
partnership in one year may have tax implications for the 
partner in different years include: 1) an adjustment that 
reduces losses or credits that the partner can carry to other 
years, or 2) an FP AA that determines the tax consequences 
of a transaction in a way that does not have actual tax 
impacts until later years. See,~, Kligfeld Holdings 
(FP AA issued in connection with 1999 contribution by 
partner to partnership, not with respect to 2000 distribution. 
to partner that gave rise to tax): 
b. One Party Files Petition for Readjustment - Section 6226 provides 
that one party will file a petition for readjustment of the 
partnership items, not necessarily all partners together. 
3. Earlier Cases Opinions 
a. Kislev - Held that the jurisdictional deposit relates to not only the 
year in question, but all tax effects of the adjusted items for all . 
years at issue. Court relied upon the Dictionary Act (1 USC § 1) to 
fmd that IRC §6226(e)(1)'s "tax liability" could be interpreted as 
''tax liabilities." Court also determined that taking the pqsition that 
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all tax effects were included in deposit was consistent with 
TEFRA's "computational adjustment" provisions, where amounts 
owed by a partner for ~l years at issue can be collected from the 
partner at the cQnclusion of the TEFRA proceeding without the 
need to issue new Notices. Finally, the Court believed that a 
taxpayer's voluntary deferral of taxes or losses into a later year 
should not affect the deposit amount. 
b. Russian Recovery Fund - A year after Kislev, the Court in Russion 
Recovery Fund arrived at the same conclusions, based on 
reasoning very similar to that in Kislev. There, the Court stated 
that "we agree with Kislev and the defendant that the total tax 
liability depository requirement trumps the singidar "return." 
Kislev, 84 Fed. Cl. at 388. Moreover, a voluntary election to defer 
losses to subsequent years should not control the deposit amount. 
Allowing an entity to do so would permit it to assure itself of a 
deposit-free chance to litigate by allocating the loss entirely to 
other years." 
F. Prestop Opinion 
1. Despite two recent cases in the Federal Claims Court to the contrary, J. 
Alegra determined that "With all due respect to the distinguished jurists 
who penned these opinions, both Kislevand Russian Recovery are 
mistaken in requiring a partner to pay the total, multi-year tax liability 
associated with the adjustment made in a FP AA as a precondition to 
challenging that adjustment." 
2. J. Alegra rejected the reasoning of the Kislev and Russian Recovery . 
opinions based on the following: . 
a. Rejection of Dictionary Act - J. Alegra found that the Dictionary 
Act did not apply because that provision is inapplicable, by its own 
terms, where the context of the statute at issue indicates that 
singular terms should not be given plural effect. J. Alegra 
determined that a review of that context indicated that, under 
TEFRA, an FPAA will be issued with respect to.a single 
partnership taxable year. Those same rules would not operate well 
in a multi-year context. 
b. Rejection of Multi-Year Approach....:. The Court rejected Kislev and 
Russian Recovery's adoption of a multi-year approach for 
calculating the jurisdictional deposit because it was contrary to 
precedent applying an annual accounting concept to federal tax 
matters. 
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c. Jurisdiction over Partnership Adjustments Where No Adjustment 
O. Implications 
to Income Occurs - Finally, citing prior court precedents, J. Alegra· 
determined that the court has jurisdiction over a partnership 
adjustment even where the FP AA does not result in an immediate 
adjustment to income or deduction. 
1. Highlights how Federal Claims Court judges are not bound by opinions of 
other judges on the court - only Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
opinions. 
2. Highlights distinction between J. Alegra's interpretation ofTEFRA 
provision (that Congress could riot have intended that the review ofa 
single FP AA would encompass all the partners' liabilities for all the 
taxable years affeCted by the partnership adjustment) and the IRS' practice 
of issuing an FP AA that makes no adjustments to income in the 
partnership taxable year referenced. If such FP AA' s can be issued, as they 
are, what purpose does the jurisdictional deposit serve? 
3. Taxpayer success in Prestop may be oflimited benefit. IRC §622S(a) 
permits the assessment of a '~deficiency attributable to any partnership 
item" and levy or proceeding in court to collect the deficiency at any time 
after the close of the. IS0th day on which the FP AA was mailed to the Tax 
Matters Partner, unless a petition is filed in the Tax Court. Nothing in IRC 
§622S(a) appears to restrict such assessments to adjustments to income 
related to only the FPAA'd year. Thus: it could be that paying a limited 
jurisdictional deposit will afford, at most, ISO days of relief before the IRS 
can proceed with a levy or action in court -to collect the remaining 
deficiency for the remaining years at issue. 
VIll. VALIDITY OF A P ARTNERSIDP 
A. Classification of the Investor as a Partner 
1. Culbertson - In this landmark case, the Supreme Court held that the test to . 
determine if a partner is treated as a partner of partnership is based on the 
conduct of parties showing that they in good faith and acting with a 
business purposes intended to join together in the present conduct of the 
enterprise. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949). The Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the Tax CoUrt because it had not made any 
findings to determine if there was a bona fide intent on the part of the 
partners to be part of a partnership. 
a. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Sth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which had held that each partner must contribute either 
vital services or capital to the partnership. The Sth Circuit found . 
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that the intent of the partners to contribute time and services in the 
future constituted sufficient grounds for recognizing a partnership 
for federal income tax purposes. (Culbertson v. Comm'r, 168 F. 2d 
979 (5th Cir. 1948)) . 
2. IRC Section 704(e)(1) states "A person shall be recognized as a partner for 
purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in 
which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or not such 
interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person. 
B. Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund'2001 LP v. Commissioner 
1. Facts: The syndicators established several partnerships (coliectively, the 
"Virginia Fund") to which they admitted nearly 300 investors. Although 
they originally intended to give the investors interests 'that were 
proportional to their investments, they ultimately gave all the investors 
.01 % interests, regardless of the size of their investment. These upper tier 
partnerships then invested in operating partnerships (the "Developer 
Partnerships"), making capital contributions and being allocated the 
Developer Partnerships' Virginia historic rehabilitation tax credits (the. 
"Virginia HTC's).These credits where then allocated to the investors 
based on the cash they contributed to the upper-tier partnerships. Finally, 
between one to six months later, the syndicators bought out the investors 
for 1/1000 of their original capital contributions. 
2. The IRS took the position that the investors should not be considered 
partners, or,ifthey were partners, that the transaction should nonetheless 
be considered a taxable sale (disguised sale under Section 707). 
3. Tax Court (T.C. Memo 2009-295): 
a. Holding: The Tax Court concluded that the investors should be 
respected as partners making a non-taxable capital contribution, 
and then getting the benefit of a loss when they sold their interests 
for a tenth-of-a-penny on the dollar. It ruled that an investor could 
make a tax-free capital contribution to become a partner of a ' 
partnership, be allocated state credits in return, and then soon' 
thereafter, sell its partnership mterest for a nominal amount, 
allowing the partnership to receive the funds without current tax 
liability while the investor could use the state credits to pay its 
state taxes, and then take a tax loss on the sale of its partnership 
interest. 
b. Rationale: 
(1) The Tax Court invoked the Culbertson standards to make 
its determination of whether the investors were to be 
considered partners. 
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(2) Factors: 
(a) Agreement between the parties 
. (i) Found that the investors executed multiple 
documents that reflected their intent to 
become partners (SUbscription agreement 
and partnership agreement) .. 
(b) Conduct of the parties in executing its provisions 
(i) Irivestors contributed capital to the 
partnership upon execution of the 
partnership d?cuments. 
(ii) Irivestors received K-ls allocating their 
respective shares of credits from the 
partnership pool in addition to other 
partnership items. . 
(iii) The investors had certain rights pursuant to 
the partnership agreements, subscription 
agreements, and option agreements under 
Virginia law. 
(c) Parties' statements 
(i) Multiple investors testified at trial that they 
understood themselves to be partners. 
(d) Testimony of disinterested persons 
. (i) . At trial, the Court heard testimony from 
representatives of accounting and 
investment firms regarding the Virginia 
Program. The investors' testimony was 
consistent with the professionals' testimony 
regarding the details of the programs. 
(e) Relationship ~f the parties 
(i) The Court found that the parties intended to 
pool their resources and share the results of 
the investment. 
(t) Partners' respective abilities and capital 
contributions 
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(i) Each party contributed something of value. 
The investors contributed capital, while the 
principals contributed both capital and 
services. 
(g) Control of the income and the purposes for which 
the income is used 
(i) The Court found this factor. to be neutral 
because the only partnership income at issue 
is based on the respondent's credit-sale 
theory. ' . 
4. 4th Circuit (639 F. 3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011): The 4th Circuit reversed the Tax 
Court in March 2011. The Appellate Court ruled that an allocation of state 
tax credits is subject to tax at the time of allocation. 
a. The Fourth Circuit determined that the transaction should be 
recharacterized as a sale of tax credits, so that the other partners of 
the partnership have taxable income instead of receiving a 
nontaxable capital contribution .. 
b. The Fourth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the investors 
were partners, and it also concluded that the state credits were 
"property. " 
c. The Appellate Court reasoned that because the investor-partners 
got this "property'.' within two years of their investment, the court 
concluded that the regulations .under section 707 required a 
presumption that the transaction was a sale, unless the investors 
could prove otherwise, something the court called a "high burden." 
In a step-by-step consideration of two basic tests, and five factors 
all of which are found in the regulations, the court concluded that 
the transaction should be treated as a sale. In concluding that (A) 
the investment would not have been made if there were no transfer 
of the state credits, and (B) there was no "entrepreneurial risk to 
the investors," the court made the following five fmdings 
(1) Timing and amount of the transfers were "determinable 
with reasonable certainty" at the time the investors made 
their capital contributions; 
(2) The tratisferor had an enforceable right to get the credits 
once it made its investment; 
(3) The investor's right to get the credits was "secured,"; 
42 
(4) The transfer of money was "disproportionately large" when 
compared to the partners' "continuing interests in 
partnerships profits"; and 
(5) The partners had no obligation to return or repay the state 
credits to the partnership. 
5; Castle Harbour3 - The set of case~ known as Castle Harbour addressed the 
relationship between the. Culbertson facts and circumstances analysis of 
the purported partnership relationships and the "capital interest" approach 
of Section 704( e). 
a. Facts: 
(1) The Castle Harbour transaction involved an agreement 
between General Electric Capital Corporation ("GECC") 
and two Dutch banks to engage in the aircraft leasing 
business. GECC contiibuted cash,· accounts receivable, and 
sixty-three airplanes .. The two Dutch banks together 
contributed cash to the partnership. Under the terms of the 
partnership agreement, 98 percent of the partnership's 
operating income was allocated to the Dutch banks and 2 
percent was allocated to GECC. Although the contributed 
aircraft.had a. tax basis of zero, their book value in the· 
hands of the partnership was equal to their fair market 
value. As a result, the aircraft generated large annual 
depreciation deductions for book purposes but no 
correspond.ing tax deductions. Thus, the taxable income of 
the partnership generally exceeded its book or economic 
income by an amount equal to the book depreciation 
deductions. The allocation of 98 percent of the 
p~ership' s operating income to the Dutch banks . 
significantly reduced the tax liability of GECC while 
shifting very little economic income to the Dutch banks. 
As a result of the application of the so-called "ceiling ~e" 
under section 704(c) of the Code (and the Treasury 
Regulations thereunder), the partnership could not allocate 
tax depreciation to the Dutch banks to match the book 
income in question. This resulted in an overstatement of 
the taxable income of the Dutch banks which essentially 
allowed GECC to "re-depreciate" the 'contributed airplanes. 
3 TIFD III-E. Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004) ("Castle Harbour I"), the original District 
Court decision,; TIFD III-E. Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir.2006) ("Castle Harbour II"), the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision,; and TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LeJ9.s 93853 (D. Conn. 
2009) ("Castle Harbour IIr'), the District Court decision on remand,. 
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(2) Under the tenns of the partnership agreement, the interests 
of the Dutch banks were to be purchased over an 8-year 
period through a self-liquidating mechanism based on the 
income of the partnership. As the interests of the Dutch .~ 
banks were bought out, the interest of GECC would . 
correspondingly increase. The partnership agreement 
provided for the payment of annual distributions to the 
Dutch banks calculated to produce an internal rate of return 
of approximately 9% over the 8-year period. Although 
payments of these amounts by the partnership were at the 
discretion of the partnership's general manager, as a 
practical matter they were mandated since nonpayment 
would give the Dutch banks the right to demand liquidation 
of the partnership. 
(3) The partnership agreement also called for the creation of 
investment accounts for the Dutch banks. Although no 
cash was actually contributed to these accounts, they were 
initially credited with an amount equal to the investment by 
the banks and the partnership. They ,were then adjusted on 
a hypothetical basis for distributions actually made to the 
banks. When the banks exited from the partnership, the 
balance iIi the investment accounts was to be predetermined 
as if such accounts had been increased' each year by an 
"applicable rate" and reduced ·by the 9 percent priority 
distributions referred to above. Upon exit, the Dutch banks 
were to receive a guaranteed payment if the hypothetical 
amount contained in their investment accounts exceeded 
the sum of operating income and disposition gain, minus 
operating losses (which were capped at approximately 
$4,000,000) and disposition losses (which were capped at 
approximately $3,000,000) previously allocated to them. 
This guaranteed payment was payable only if the banks had 
not previously received net allocations of operating income 
and gain sufficient to provide the specified minimum yield 
on their investments. In effect, the banks were entitled to 
the guaranteed payment if the balance in their investment 
accounts exceeded their book capital accounts as fmally 
determined. 
(4) The operating cash flow generated by the partnership 
generally was applied to fund distributions, to service debt,. 
and to pay expenses. The partnership agreement provided 
that GECC was entitled to gruiranteed payments (the so-
called "class B guaranteed payments") that were treated as 
operating expenses at the partnership and did not reduce 
GECC's capital account. Any cash not needed to pay 
partnership distributions and expenses was transferred to a 
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U.S. corporation that was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the . 
partnership. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, 
this subsidiary was obligated to maintain "core financial 
assets;" consisting of cash and high-grade securities 
(including GECC's commercial paper) equal to 110 percent 
of the current value of the investment accounts of the Dutch 
banks. 
b. Holdings: Castle Harbor I originally was tried in 2004. The 
District Court held in favor of the taxpayer. The IRS then 
appealed the case to the Second Circuit, which reversed the 
decision of the District Court in part and held in favor of the 
government ("Castle Harbor II"), but also remanded the case to the 
District Court to address the applicability of Section 704( e) of the 
Code. On remand, the District Court once again held in favor of 
the taxpayer, conchiding that Section 704( e) of the Code compels· 
the conclusion that the foreign banks involved in the transaction 
should be treated as partners for Federal income tax purposes 
("Castle Harbor III"). 
c. Castle Harbour I Analysis: Held that the creation of an LLC was 
not a sham designed solely to avoid taxes. While the transaction 
sheltered a great deal of income from taxes, it was permissible. 
d. Castle Harbour II Analysis: The Second Circuit held that the Dutch 
banks were promised a return of their investment and had no 
practical risks of loss. Also, the banks potential gain was capped. 
The Dutch banks were secured in such a manner that they would 
be repaid in full with interest from a source to which the general 
creditors had no access. According to the Appellate Court, the 
apparent subordination found by the District Court was a fiction 
overridden by GECC's guaranty. Castle Harbour II at p. 237. 
Therefore, the Second Circuit overturned the District Court 
opinion and remanded it back to the District Court to determine if 
the partnership was a family partnership under Section 704( e) . 
. e. Castle Harbour III Analysis: Although the Second Circuit held that 
the Bank's inte:rest was "debt-like," the District Court said that did 
not mean it could not be treated as an equity interes~. 
(1) . The analysis considered whether the Bank was like a real 
owner. 
(a) GECC did not control the Banks' capital, because 
the Banks could force a liquidation of the 
partnership. . 
(b) The Banks participated in management. 
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(c) On certain transactions their consent was required. 
(d) The partnership treated the Banks as partners for all 
purposes. 
(e) The Banks received distributions for the "sole use 
and benefit" of their distributed shares of income . 
. (t) The Banks were not guaranteed a return. 
(2) Held: It is Unimportant whether a particular partners' 
capital was employed, as long as overall, the partnership 
used its capital to produce income. The District Court's 
ultimate finding was that the Banks were partners in Castle 
Harbour. 
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